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BANDA-ORTIZ v. GONZALES: A CATCH-22 FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Jared Carrubba*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit created a circuit split by holding that an alien's timely filed motion to
reopen removal proceedings ("motion to reopen") does not toll a previously granted voluntary departure period. Because of the structure of the
statutes and regulations governing motions to reopen and voluntary departure, this holding created a Catch-22 for aliens subject to voluntary departure seeking relief in the form of a motion to reopen. In order to fully
understand the implications of this holding, a brief introduction to the various concepts present in the case is necessary. United States immigration
law provides that aliens not legally admitted into the country may have
removal proceedings instituted against them in order to enforce their departure from the country. 2 Once an alien is found to be subject to removability, he or she may be allowed to depart the country voluntarily upon
meeting certain requirements. 3 Furthermore, federal law provides that
aliens subject to removability are allowed to file one motion to reopen removal proceedings in order to present new evidence not available at the
time of the original hearing that would allow the alien to remain in the
United States.4
This Note provides an overview of the origins and development of the
law governing voluntary departure and motions to reopen. It then provides a detailed explanation of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Banda-Ortiz. Additionally, it discusses how the majority, while attempting
to address legitimate concerns, used flawed logic and reasoning to reach an
incorrect conclusion. After explaining the possible implications of the decision, a solution is proposed that would better address the concerns of both
the majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, this note discusses possible
future consideration by the United States Supreme Court.

* The author thanks Gregory Bowman, Associate Professor of Law at Mississippi College
School of Law, for his time and insightful guidance during the development and writing of this Note. I
would also like to thank my fiance, Bethanie, for her continuous and unwavering support throughout
this process as well as all other aspects of my law school career.
1. 445 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2006).
2. 3 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 13:1 (2d ed. 2007).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

Background

In 1989, Sergio Banda-Ortiz entered the United States from Mexico,
where he was a citizen. 5 He remained in the United States for eleven years
without incident. 6 During his time in the United States, Banda-Ortiz had
two children; he was employed and was never convicted of a crime.7 In
March 2000, Banda-Ortiz received a Notice to Appear from the Immigration and Naturalization Service charging him with removability for being
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.8 After
conceding removability, Banda-Ortiz applied for cancellation of removal
based on a claim that leaving the United States would impose "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" 9 on his adoptive parents and his older
0
son.'
Banda-Ortiz applied in the alternative for voluntary departure." To
be eligible for voluntary departure as opposed to removal, Banda-Ortiz
was required by statute' 2 to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he had both the intent to leave the United States and the means to do so. 1"
After considering the application, the immigration judge denied cancellation of removal but granted the request for voluntary departure. 4
B. Appeals and Motions
Banda-Ortiz appealed the immigration judge's decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which affirmed the decision on August
22, 2002 granting Banda-Ortiz 30 days to voluntarily depart the country. 5
In compliance with statutory requirements,' 6 the BIA's decision included a
notice stating that Banda-Ortiz's failure to leave the country within the
time period specified would result in, inter alia,ineligibility "for a period of
10 years for any further relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245,
248, and 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act."'1 7 However, instead
of leaving the country within the required time period, Banda-Ortiz filed a
motion to reopen his removal proceedings for the purpose of presenting
new evidence that his departure would result in undue hardship on his family.' 8 The factual basis for his motion was that during the pendency of his
5. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 388.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
10. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 388 (the opinion does not provide any further explanation about
this claim).
11. Id.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D) (2006).
13. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 388.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(3).
17. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 388 n.1.
18. Id. at 388; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (permitting an alien to file one motion to reopen).
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appeal to the BIA in the original proceeding, his younger son was born
with medical conditions requiring constant attention that one doctor
opined would not be available in Mexico. 9 The motion did not contain
any request to stay removal, to toll the voluntary departure period, or to
reinstate the voluntary departure period.20 Despite the absence of such a
request in the motion, the BIA granted the motion to reopen and remanded the case to the immigration judge for consideration of new evidence in support of his application for cancellation of removal. 2'
Following a hearing on the matter, the immigration judge held that
statutory law2 2 rendered Banda-Ortiz ineligible for cancellation of removal
because he failed to timely depart the country while his motion was pending.23 The BIA affirmed the decision, rejecting Banda-Ortiz's argument
that his filing of the motion to reopen automatically tolled the voluntary
departure period. 4 The BIA further held that it had erred in initially
granting the motion to reopen.2 5 Banda-Ortiz appealed the BIA's decision
to The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

Historical Development and the Enactment of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

Before considering case law on the issue presented in Banda-Ortiz, it
is important to have an understanding of the historical development of motions to reopen and voluntary departure, as well as the relationship between them. Most important to consider in the development of this area of
immigration law is Congress' 1996 enactment of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 2 6 ("IIRIRA"), which created
the seemingly inconsistent statutory scheme considered in the case law.
1. Origins of Motions to Reopen and Voluntary Departure
Motions to reopen removal proceedings have a long history in immigration law. Their basic purpose is to allow an alien a means to provide
immigration authorities with new evidence not available at the former
hearing that could allow the alien to remain in the United States. 7 The
Immigration Bureau began hearing motions to reopen as early as 1916,28
19. Id. at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 388 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (providing that an alien who voluntarily fails to depart the country within
the specified time period is ineligible for cancellation of removal).
23. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 388.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
27. Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2004).
28. See Chew Hoy Quong v. white, 244 F. 749 (9th Cir. 1917); Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579,
580 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
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and were included in federal regulations in 1941.29 While this regulatory
scheme allowed aliens to file motions to reopen, it did not confer upon
them a right to do so.3" Also, the regulations limited neither the time period for filing, nor the allowed number of such motions.31
Voluntary departure originated in the first quarter of the twentieth
century as well. It was first mentioned in federal case law in 1923,32 and
voluntary departure provisions were first codified by Congress in 1940.33
The purpose behind allowing aliens to voluntarily depart the United States
was, and still is, to reduce governmental "costs associated with deporting
individuals from the United States," and to provide "a mechanism for illegal aliens to leave the country without being subject to the stigma or bars to
future relief that are part of the sanction of deportation. ' 34 Prior to the
enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, the statute regulating voluntary departure35
contained no time restriction on the period for which it could be granted,
and "[in
practice, voluntary departure was granted for generous periods of
36
time."

Because no rigid time limits were contained in the pre-IIRIRA statutes and regulations governing motions to reopen and voluntary departure,
the interaction between the two was fairly simple. The common practice in
the administrative agencies and courts was to extend the voluntary departure period freely "so that the BIA would have time to rule on [a motion to
reopen] before the alien would have been required to depart."37 As discussed in the next subsection, the rigid statutory time restrictions now in
place for voluntary departure have made this practice virtually impossible,
thus giving rise to the issue presented in Banda-Ortiz of whether filing a
motion to reopen removal proceedings tolls the voluntary departure
period.

29. See New Regulations Governing the Arrest and Deportation of Aliens, 6 Fed. Reg. 68, 71-72
(Jan. 4, 1941) (containing the first mention of motions to reopen in the Federal Register); Azarte, 394
F.3d at 1283.
30. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283 (noting that the first statutory right for aliens to file a motion to
reopen came in 1996).
31. Id.; see also New Regulations Governing the Arrest and Deportation of Aliens § 19.8(a), 6
Fed. Reg. 68, 71-72 (Jan. 4, 1941); 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190
(9th Cir. 2001).
32. United States ex rel. Patton v. Tod, 292 F. 243, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ("arrangements were
made for the execution of a new bond which was authorized by the Bureau July 15, 1915, guaranteeing
the alien's voluntary departure without expense to the government at the expiration of the bond ......
(emphasis added).
33. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1284.
34. Id.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1995) (repealed 1996).
36. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1284.
37. Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2005); see also AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN JR.
& STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:4.6[A] (stating that prior to IIRIRA, courts often granted voluntary departure periods longer than 120 days and

sometimes even for one to two-year periods for certain classes of aliens).
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2. The 1996 Statutory Changes
In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, thereby drastically altering the
statutory landscape governing motions to reopen and voluntary departure.38 One major change in the law came about because the Department
of Justice expressed concern that aliens were abusing motions to reopen.39
This concern resulted in Congress codifying the first statutory form of relief
for motions to reopen, conferring upon aliens a statutory right to file a
motion to reopen removal proceedings while at the same time imposing
restrictions on aliens that were not present under the former regulatory
scheme.4 0 These restrictions, which remain in place today, limit the number of allowed motions to one and provide that the motion must be filed
"within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. ' 4 1 In addition to the new restrictions, the federal regulations implementing the statute provide that a motion to reopen will be deemed
withdrawn if an alien departs the country after filing the motion.42
IIRIRA also changed statutory law provisions regarding voluntary departure. Specifically, the new law only allowed aliens to be granted a maximum of sixty days to depart the country, if granted at the conclusion of
removal proceedings.43 The new law also provided harsh penalties for
aliens who failed to leave the country within the voluntary departure period. 4 The Azarte court noted that federal agencies have generally interpreted this deadline strictly.45
Thus, under the IIRIRA provisions, if an alien fails to depart prior to
the expiration of the voluntary departure period, he is precluded from receiving an adjustment of status for ten years. On the other hand, if the
alien leaves the country within the voluntary departure period, he withdraws any pending motion to reopen. This seemingly inconsistent interaction created a significant question concerning the effect motions to reopen
had on voluntary departure periods. The common practice under the preIIRIRA statutes and regulations discussed above was no longer an option,
as the new law severely limited the time period the BIA could grant to
aliens eligible for voluntary departure. The new laws, however, contained
38. Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003); see generally Lenni B. Benson, Making PaperDolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase
Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 48-56 (2006-2007) (generally discussing the new restrictions implemented with the 1996 statutory changes).
39. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283.
40. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) (1996); 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (1997) (recodified as 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c) (2006)).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2006).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2006).
44. See id. § 1229c(d) (providing that failure to timely depart will result in a monetary fine and
bar violators from obtaining certain forms of relief).
45. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285; see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (providing that "[in no event can the total
period of time, including any extension exceed 120 days or 60 days," depending on when the immigration judge grants voluntary departure).
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no mention of what effect, if any, motions to reopen should have on voluntary departure periods. Additionally, the Department of Justice explicitly
stated it "has not adopted any position" on the issue.4 6 Thus, this question
was left for the courts to resolve.
B.

Azarte v. Ashcroft: The Ninth Circuit Answers

The Ninth Circuit provided an answer to this question in 2005 when it
decided Azarte v. Ashcroft.4 7 Salvador and Celia Azarte illegally entered
the United States from Mexico in 1987 and remained in the country for
more than ten years.4 8 They were charged with removability, and after a
hearing and appeal, they were granted voluntary departure.49 Seven days
before expiration of the voluntary departure period, the Azartes filed a
motion to reopen removal proceedings and requested a stay of removal;
however, the BIA did not act on the motion until six months later.5" The
BIA, never reaching the merits of the motion, ruled that the Azartes were
ineligible for cancellation of removal because they did not leave the country before expiration of the voluntary departure period."
The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's decision and held that the motion to reopen and request for stay of removal tolled the voluntary departure period so that the BIA could consider the motion on the merits.5 2 In
so holding, the court overruled Shaar v. INS,53 a pre-IIRIRA case, on the
ground that the rationale behind that decision was no longer applicable
after IIRIRA.54 Specifically, the Azarte court noted that prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, there was no statutory right for an alien to file a motion
to reopen.5 5 The BIA's interpretation, the court said, precluded aliens afforded voluntary departure from exercising this statutory right to have
their motion to reopen decided on the merits because the BIA would not
ever realistically be able to rule on such a motion before expiration of the
voluntary departure period.5 6 In the court's view, the best way to give
force to both the voluntary departure and motion to reopen statutes was to
toll the voluntary departure period when an alien filed a motion to reopen
"prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period... at least when
he requests a stay of removal."5 7 The court went on to state that the BIA's
46. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285.
47. 394 F.3d 1278.
48. Id. at 1280.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1280-81.
51. Id. at 1281.
52. Id. at 1289.
53. 141 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1998).
54. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1282.
57. Id. at 1288 (It is important to note that the court in Azarte did not decide the issue of whether
a properly filed motion to reopen automatically tolled the voluntary departure period, although it noted
that such an interpretation would be consistent with the legislative scheme).
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interpretation would produce an absurd result, and it would be "nonsensical that Congress would have allowed aliens subject to voluntary departure
to file motions to reopen but would have simultaneously precluded the
BIA from issuing decisions on those motions."5 8 Finally, the Azarte court
concluded that if Congress had intended to deprive aliens granted voluntary departure of the right to relief in59the form of motions to reopen, "we
are confident it would have said so."
Azarte was an important decision in the development of this area of
immigration law. It established precedent in the Ninth Circuit, allowing
aliens granted voluntary departure continued access to a form of relief historically available to them. Also, Azarte provided some guidance for other
federal courts that would consider the issue.
C.

Other Circuits Fall in Line

Azarte was decided in January, 2005. Later that year, both the Third
and Eighth Circuits considered the issue of whether motions to reopen
tolled the voluntary departure period. The Eighth Circuit's decision was
handed down in May, 2005 in Sidikhouya v. Gonzales.6 ° Youssef
Sidikhouya entered the United States from Morocco on a visitor visa and
failed to leave the country when it expired.61 He was charged with removability in 2001.62 He conceded removability, and the immigration judge
granted voluntary departure.6 3 He appealed this decision to the BIA,
which affirmed the decision in 2004.64 One day before the expiration of his
voluntary departure period, Sidikhouya filed a motion to reopen and request for a stay of voluntary departure with the BIA to present evidence of
his marriage to a United States citizen during the pendency of his appeal.6 5
A month later, the BIA denied the motion based solely on grounds that
Sidikhouya had overstayed his voluntary departure period.6 6
The Eighth Circuit reversed the BIA's decision in a per curiam opinion. The court relied primarily on the reasoning in Azarte and agreed with
its holding that an alien "must be afforded an opportunity to receive a ruling on the merits of his timely filed motion to reopen .
"..."67However,
Chief Judge Loken, although concurring in the judgment, did not agree
with adopting Azarte as the law in the Eighth Circuit because of its "undeferential interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations .... 68
He believed the proper approach would have been to defer ruling on the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
407 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 952.
Id.
Id. at 953 (Loken, C.J. dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
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issue until after the BIA expressed its "views as to its own procedural authority" to stay the voluntary departure period during the pendency of motions to reopen. 69
Four months after the Eighth Circuit's decision in Sidikhouya, the
Third Circuit considered the issue in Kanivets v. Gonzales.7 ° Oleg Kanivets
entered the United States in 1998, and after expiration of his authorized
stay in 1999, he filed for asylum claiming that he suffered persecution in his
home nation of Kyrgyzstan. 7 1 The immigration judge denied the application for asylum and granted voluntary departure.7" The BIA affirmed the
decision and granted Kanivets thirty days to depart the country.7 3 Six days
before the expiration of his voluntary departure period, Kanivets filed a
motion to reopen and a request for a stay of removal. 74 Eight months later,
the BIA denied the motion because Kanivets failed to leave the country
before expiration of his voluntary departure period.
The Third Circuit reversed and followed the lead of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits in holding that a timely filed motion to reopen tolls the voluntary departure period. 76 The court relied extensively on the reasoning in
Azarte to reach its decision, and noted "the day that the motion [to reopen]
was filed was the critical beginning point" to determine eligibility for relief,
"rather than the date of adjudication. '7 7 One important aspect of Kanivets
was that the court distinguished that case from its previous holding in Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft,78 in which the court had held that it had no power
to extend the voluntary departure date. 79 The court stated that the situation presented in Kanivets was different than that in Reynoso-Lopez because it was tolling the voluntary departure period.80 In making this
distinction, the court implicitly recognized that tolling was a different form
of relief than extending the departure period.
D.

Barroso v. Gonzales: The Ninth Circuit Extends Azarte

Ten months after the Ninth Circuit decided Azarte, that court again
addressed whether the voluntary departure period was tolled during the
pendency of certain motions. 8' The procedural device in question in Barroso was a motion to reconsider82 rather than a motion to reopen; however,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 953-54 (Loken, C.J. dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
424 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
See Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 336.
Id. at 335 (citing Barrios v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 399 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2005)).
369 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 335.

80. Id.
81. Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005).
82. Motions to reconsider operate the same way as motions to reopen; however, rather than
considering new evidence, a motion to reconsider alleges that an error of law or fact was made in the
original proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) (2006).
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the court noted that "the motion to reconsider provision interacts with the
voluntary departure provision in precisely the same way" as the motion to
reopen provision.83 The case presented the same basic procedural scheme
found in the other cases. After affirming the immigration judge's denial of
cancellation of removal, the BIA granted Barroso thirty days to depart the
country.' Barroso filed a motion to reconsider on the last day of his voluntary departure period, and two and a half months later the BIA denied
the motion on grounds that Barroso failed to leave the United States
before the expiration of his voluntary departure period. 85 The one glaring
difference between Azarte and Barroso was that, unlike the petitioners in
the former case, Barroso failed to file a request to stay the voluntary departure period along with his motion to reconsider.8 6 Thus, the court had to
consider whether filing a motion to reopen/reconsider automatically tolled
the voluntary departure period until disposal of the motion on the merits.
The Barroso court began its analysis by recognizing the "significant
conundrum" presented by the provisions governing voluntary departure
and motions to reopen/reconsider, and noted that the BIA's interpretation
precluded aliens granted voluntary departure from receiving a ruling on
the merits of their motions.87 The court then proceeded to consider
whether its recent decision in Azarte applied to the present case. Azarte,
while not deciding on the issue of automatic tolling, observed "that automatically tolling the voluntary departure period upon filing of a motion to
reopen 'would be consistent with the legislative scheme.' "88 In support of
this assertion, the Barroso court looked to the interim rule promulgated by
the Department of Justice which, while not adopting a hard line stance on
the effect of a motion to reopen on the voluntary departure period, set
forth three possible solutions.8 9 Two of the three proposed solutions included always tolling the voluntary departure period until after a decision
on the merits of the motion. 90 The court considered these proposed solutions as evidence that the Government contemplated automatic tolling as a
logical solution to determining the interaction between motions to reopen/
reconsider and voluntary departure. 91
The next step for the Barroso court in determining the applicability of
Azarte was to discuss whether there were any possible bars to automatic
tolling found in statutes or regulations. The court noted that the IIRIRA
83. Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1201 n.12.
84. Id. at 1200.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1204.
87. Id. at 1200-01.
88. Id. at 1205 (quoting Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1288 n.20 (9th Cir. 2005)).
89. Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1205.
90. See Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1205 (referencing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens;
Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg.
10,312, 10,325-26 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim rule)).
91. Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1205.
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statutes and regulations contained no provisions concerning tolling the voluntary departure period, and specifically, that the provisions did not require an alien to file a request to stay the voluntary departure period.9 2
Although the regulations did limit the court's ability to extend the voluntary departure period.93 Instead, the court held that "automatic tolling
does not extend the amount of time granted for voluntary departure" by
adding more time to the departure period; it simply stops the clock from
running. 94 The court therefore concluded that there were no statutory or
regulatory bars to automatically tolling the voluntary departure period.9 5
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that not only did
Azarte apply to Barroso's case, but that it required automatic tolling of the
voluntary departure period during the pendency of a motion to reopen/
reconsider. 96 The court held that Azarte required the BIA to grant any
request for a stay of the voluntary departure period accompanying a motion to reopen/reconsider so that the alien would be afforded his statutory
right to have the motion heard on the merits. 97 Since the BIA could not
deny such a request, the court held that requiring an alien to file the request "would amount to nothing more than an empty procedural requirement that would simply place an additional bureaucratic burden on aliens
who in any event often have difficulty following the complex procedural
requirements of our immigration laws."98 Consequently, the court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider because the voluntary departure period was automatically tolled
when Barroso filed his motion.99
IV.

INSTANT CASE

Judge Garza wrote the majority opinion in Banda-Ortiz,"' in which
Judge Jolly joined.10 1 Judge Smith dissented and filed a separate
opinion. 102
A.

Majority Opinion

1. Jurisdiction and Overview of Statutory Scheme
After reciting the factual and procedural posture of the case, Judge
Garza began Part II of the opinion by setting forth the court's jurisdiction
to review the BIA's denial of Banda-Ortiz's motion to reopen and stating
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1205-06.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2006).
Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1206 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1208.
445 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 391.
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that the court reviews for abuse of discretion. 10 3 He then stated that the
case concerned "the interaction of several statutory provisions and an administrative regulation concerning voluntary departure and motions to reopen, "104 and proceeded to give a brief overview of the statutes at issue in
the case.' °5 Judge Garza then restated the BIA's holding that Banda-Ortiz
was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he remained in the
10 6
United States after the expiration of the voluntary departure period.
2.

Automatic Tolling

The main issue presented in the case was whether a timely filed motion to reopen removal proceedings tolled Banda-Ortiz's voluntary departure period. 10 7 Banda-Ortiz argued that filing such a motion did toll the
voluntary departure period, despite the statutory scheme laid out by the
court.10 8 He argued that the statute and regulation created a Catch-22 because if he left the country during the voluntary departure period, his motion would have been withdrawn pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d);
however, if he remained in the country after expiration of the voluntary
departure period, he would be ineligible for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d).10 9 Banda-Ortiz relied on Azarte to support this
argument, stating that it would be nonsensical for Congress to allow an
alien the right to file a motion to reopen when that motion would be withdrawn when the alien adheres to the voluntary departure order. 11 0
The court rejected this argument, holding that such a result would be
contrary to the purpose of allowing an alien to elect voluntary departure.1 '
The court first explained the nature of voluntary departure, stating that it
"is the result of an agreed-upon exchange of benefits between an alien and
the Government. 1 12 Next, the court outlined the various benefits voluntary departure provides to the alien, including "1) the ability to choose his
own destination point; 2) the opportunity to put his affairs in order without
fear of being taken into custody; 3) freedom from extended detention while
103. Id. at 388 (citing Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005)).
104. Id.
105. The specific statutes cited were 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006) (allowing the Attorney General
to permit an alien to voluntarily leave the United States); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2006) (providing that
voluntary departure period shall not exceed 60 days); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (2006) (setting forth the
penalties for an alien who fails to voluntarily depart the country within the specified time); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A) (2006) (allowing an alien to file one motion to reopen proceedings); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i) (2006) (providing motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of the
final administrative order); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2006) (providing that the departure of an alien from
the United States while a motion to reopen is pending constitutes a withdrawal of the motion).
106. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 389-390.
112. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389.
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the Government prepares for his removal; 4) avoidance of the stigma 113
of
forced removal; and 5) continued eligibility for an adjustment of status."
The court then explained that these benefits are not free; they come
with a cost to the alien because voluntary departure "exposes him to civil
fines and renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief if he does not
114
timely depart.
The court then explained that the benefits provided to an alien who
elects voluntary departure furthered one of the purposes behind the statute, which is to alleviate the use of Government money and resources on
removing the alien from the country. 115 The court relied on Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS1" 6 for the proposition that the purpose is not furthered and the
benefit to the Government is lost if the alien does not leave the country
within the specified time period and the Government becomes involved in
further, costly proceedings. 1 7 Finally, the court concluded its rejection of
Banda-Ortiz's argument by stating that he was seeking "the opportunity to
litigate to the last without bearing the attendant costs [and] the chance of
winning outright, plus benefits the law offers to those who avoid litigation
11 8
through voluntary departure.,
The court then switched gears and attacked Banda-Ortiz's argument
from another angle, stating the remedy he sought was incompatible with
limits placed on the length of the period of voluntary departure and the
authority to extend such a period.1 19 The court quoted a statute12 0 and a
regulation12 1 which seem to place a cap on the voluntary departure period
at 60 days that could not be met if filing a motion to reopen automatically
tolled the voluntary departure period.12 2 The court then questioned
whether the judiciary even had the power to extend the period and implied
1 23
that such power was more properly placed in the executive.
Banda-Ortiz argued that this conclusion was incorrect because Congress did not exclude aliens electing voluntary departure from filing a motion to reopen removal proceedings. 2 4 The court rejected this argument
stating that an alien who has elected voluntary departure may file a motion
to reopen removal proceedings so long as it does not interfere with the
113. Id. at 389-90.
114. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (2006)).
115. Id. at 390.
116. 546 F.3d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976) (the court declined to extend the departure period for consideration of a frivolous appeal).
117. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390.
118. Id. (quoting Alimi v. Ashcroft, 391 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2004)).
119. Id.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2006) ("Permission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall
not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days").
121. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2006) ("In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed ... 60 days as set forth in [8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2)]").
122. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390.
123. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(0 (2006)).
124. Id. at 391; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
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alien's voluntary departure date
and that an interpretation requiring auto12 5
matic tolling was incorrect.
B. Judge Smith's Dissent
Judge Smith began his dissent by chastising the majority for creating a
circuit split "unnecessarily" on what he considered to be an important issue
of immigration law. 12 6 It was his view that Congress could not have intended for the majority to reach the result it did. 2 7 Judge Smith explained
in Part I that the Fifth Circuit was the fourth appellate circuit to consider
the issue of whether a timely filed motion to reopen tolls the voluntary
departure date and that it was the first to hold that it did not. 128 His view
was that the majority's holding could not overcome the "'high hurdle' of
' 129
preserving the uniformity of the circuits.
Judge Smith continued in Part I stating that the majority, in reaching
its conclusion, erred in relying almost exclusively on provisions governing
voluntary departure to determine Congress' intent instead of looking also
to provisions concerning motions to reopen. 30 He believed this narrow
view taken by the majority caused it to erroneously rely on two principal
arguments and reach an incorrect conclusion. 131 Judge Smith believed the
correct interpretation of Congress' intent was found in the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Azarte,132 and that Congress never suggested that the nature of
an alien's departure from the country has any bearing on that alien's right
to file a motion to reopen removal proceedings. 3 3 Judge Smith objected to
the majority looking at the departure statute in isolation and argued that
the Azarte court was correct in looking to other statutes as well and concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude aliens34electing voluntary
departure from being able to file a motion to reopen.1
Judge Smith then argued that the time table implemented by Congress
for filing a motion to reopen was incompatible with the majority's holding. 135 The statute governing motions to reopen grants aliens the right to
125. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391.
126. Id. at 391 (Smith, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391. Judge Smith framed the majority's arguments as "first, that it
is sensible for aliens who receive the benefits of voluntary departure to incur the costs associated with
not leaving the country in a timely fashion, and second, that courts have no authority to extend the
voluntary departure period beyond the sixty days authorized by statute."
132. Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding tolling was necessary to
"avoid creating an incompatibility in the statutory scheme, to implement a workable procedure for
motions to reopen in cases in which aliens are granted voluntary departure, and to effectuate the purposes of the two statutory provisions.").
133. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 392 (Smith, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 393.
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file a motion to reopen "within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. 13 6 Under the majority's holding, however,
an alien granted voluntary departure would have a maximum of 60 days to
leave the country, at which point, any pending motion to reopen would be
withdrawn.' 37 In Judge Smith's view, Congress' grant of 90 days to file a
motion to reopen made little sense "if, in a substantial number of cases, the
order of removal itself would result in forfeiture of the motion."1 3' 8 He
argued such a result would put Banda-Ortiz in the untenable position of
choosing between leaving the country and forfeiting his motion to reopen,
or remaining in the country beyond the expiration of the departure period
only to 139
have his motion denied as a result of his failure to leave the
country.
Judge Smith considered the majority's ruling "particularly harsh"
when viewed in light of the fact that only aliens who have exhibited good
behavior are eligible for voluntary departure. 140 He illustrated this argument by pointing out that Banda-Ortiz was employed and had never been
convicted of a crime and the circumstances upon which he based his motion
to reopen did not arise until after the original proceeding-in which he was
granted voluntary departure-was on appeal. 4 ' Judge Smith also used this
example to illustrate that the only means by which an alien can introduce
new evidence not available at the time of the original removal proceeding
is through a motion to reopen, and that this type of situation was precisely
why Congress granted aliens a right to file such a motion.'4 2
Judge Smith's final argument in Part I of his dissent was that tolling
was compatible with all of Congress' objectives in IIRIRA, as opposed to
the majority's holding, which he argued could not accord with due process.' 43 In his view, tolling would "preserve[ ] the right of all removable
aliens to file a single, good-faith motion to reopen after a final adjudicative
order of the BIA," and would allow aliens eligible for voluntary departure
to seek such relief "without fear of surrendering other avenues of procedural relief."'" Judge Smith stated that this interpretation would not undermine the time limits placed on voluntary departure because the total
amount of time allotted still would not exceed sixty days and potential for
145
abuse would be kept in check by the limits placed on motions to reopen.
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006).
137. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2006) (stating any departure from the United States subsequent to
the filing of a motion to reopen "shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion").
138. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 393-94, n.7. Judge Smith argued that to hinge the outcome of a motion to reopen on
whether the BIA could hear the motion before expiration of the voluntary departure period violated
due process because a "system or procedure that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner
...necessarily presents an unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated." (quoting
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982).
144. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 394.
145. Id.
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In Part II of his dissent, Judge Smith argued that part of the reason the
majority reached the conclusion it did was because it believed it lacked the
authority to toll the voluntary departure period.' 46 He argued that of the
four cases the majority relied on to reach this conclusion,1 47 three were
decided by the Third and Ninth Circuits, which subsequently adopted the
approach proffered by Banda-Ortiz.' 4 8 Judge Smith further argued that
Ngarurih,the fourth case the majority cited, was not inconsistent with holding for Banda-Ortiz because the main rationale behind the Fourth Circuit's
holding in that case was that "the court could continue to hear the merits of
a petition for review even after the alien had left the country" under 8
U.S.C. § 1252.149 Thus, Judge Smith argued that Ngarurih presented a different situation than that found in Banda-Ortiz because, unlike the asylum
application at issue in that case, federal regulations preclude an appellate
court from
considering a motion to reopen after the alien leaves the
0
country.

15

Judge Smith then argued that the court's strict reliance on 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(b)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) "proves both too much and too
little in this case. ' 151 He argued that the strict reading proved too much
because it questioned the longstanding practice of tolling the voluntary departure period. 152 He argued that the strict reading proved too little because the court was "faced with conflicting legislative commands," thus,
some damage to the statutory text was inevitable.15 3 He continued stating
that the motion to reopen statute1 54 confers a right to file the motion on all
aliens and does not exclude those granted voluntary departure. 155 Based on
this rationale, Judge Smith concluded that "the panel majority's decision
carves out an exception to the motion-to-reopen statute that its text cannot
1
bear."'

56

Judge Smith concluded his dissent by stating his belief that the court
should have deferred to "the accumulated wisdom of our sister circuits," or
at least adhered to the principle of construing ambiguities in immigration
146. Id.
147. The four cases the majority cited were Reynoso Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir.
2004) ("[U]nder IIRIRA, the executive branch, not the judiciary, is given the sole authority to determine when an alien must depart."); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182,194 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the court of appeals may not toll the voluntary departure period during judicial review); Garcia v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the court of appeals lacks authority to grant
a motion for stay of the voluntary departure period filed after that period has expired); Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) ("It is executive rather than judicial officers who
decide when an alien must depart"); see Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390 n.3.
148. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 394 (Smith, J., dissenting); see Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330
(3d Cir. 2005); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d
1195 (9th Cir. 2005).
149. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 394 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 192-93).
150. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2006)).
151. Id. at 395.
*152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006).
155. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 395 (Smith, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
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statutes in favor of the alien since it would promote a fair result for aliens
and avoid creating a circuit split.' 5 7
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Subsequent Decisions

In the time between the date when Banda-Ortiz was decided and this
writing in March 2007, two other federal circuits have ruled on the issue.
Three months after Banda-Ortiz, the Eleventh Circuit decided Ugokwe v.
U.S. Attorney General.'5 8 The BIA denied the petitioner's motion to reopen based on her failure to depart the country before the expiration of the
voluntary departure period.' 59 After considering Azarte, Sidikhouya, and
Kanivets, the court discussed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Banda-Ortiz
and Judge Smith's dissent.160 The court concluded from its survey of the
cases that the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, along with Judge Smith in
his dissent in Banda-Ortiz, had reached the correct conclusion concerning
the interaction between voluntary departure and motions to reopen. 16' It
also provided that it could not, "as did the Fifth Circuit, exclusively focus
on the voluntary departure standards and ignore the motion to reopen provisions," because doing so would create an exception to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7) which grants all aliens a statutory right to file one motion to
reopen. 162 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that a timely filed motion
to reopen tolls the voluntary departure period while the motion is
1 63
pending.
The Fourth Circuit entered the mix on August 18, 2006 when it decided Dekoladenu v. Gonzales.164 Like the Fifth Circuit, the court in Dekoladenu declined to follow Azarte and held "both the plain language of the
statute and clear congressional intent explicitly limit the time allowed '1for
65
voluntary departure and do not allow for judicial tolling of these limits."
The main rationale behind the court's holding was that cannons of statutory construction required the more specific voluntary departure provision,
available to only some aliens, to control over the more general motion to
reopen provision available to all aliens. 6 6 Under this approach, the
smaller class of aliens granted voluntary departure would have to abide by
the shorter time limits established in the voluntary departure statute.
The court recognized that this approach would preclude aliens granted
voluntary departure from receiving a ruling on the merits on their motions
to reopen; however, it concluded that "[b]ecause voluntary departure is a
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 396 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
453 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1330-31 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1331.
459 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
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privilege that is only available to a subset of removable aliens, it is neither
'absurd' nor 'nonsensical' to require aliens who wish to reap the benefits of
voluntary departure to give up their right to a resolution of a motion to
reopen. 16 7 To hold otherwise, the court stated, would make the time limits imposed for voluntary departure meaningless because aliens granted
voluntary departure could simply file a motion to reopen and toll the voluntary departure period.168
B.

Analysis of the Majority Opinion and Judge Smith's Dissent

The overarching concern behind the holding in Banda-Ortiz seems to
be the majority's view that any benefit derived from tolling the voluntary
departure period upon the filing of a motion to reopen is outweighed by
the potential for abuse. The majority's holding addresses legitimate concerns; however, the rationale used to buttress its conclusion is based on
weak legal foundation.
The majority reasons that tolling the departure period would undermine the "exchange of benefits between an alien and the Government"
present in voluntary departure.169 In its view, if the alien was allowed to
remain in the country and have his motion to reopen heard, then the benefit to the Government of a quick departure by the alien would be lost. 7 '
This reasoning, however, ignores decades of tradition in which courts
granted voluntary departure for generous periods of time that allowed
aliens to remain in the country during the pendency of a motion to reopen. 171 Thus, the Government historically has not considered the benefit
of voluntary departure to be lost by allowing an alien to stay in the country
and have his or her motion to reopen heard on the merits.
The majority's "benefit" analysis is further undermined by current
practices that allow the alien to remain in the country during the time that
his appeal to the BIA is pending.' 72 Indeed, in the instant case, BandaOrtiz remained in the country awaiting appeal for six months after the immigration judge's initial grant of voluntary departure.1 73 The majority,
however, did not object to this accepted practice. Therefore, the majority's
conclusion that the benefit of a speedy departure is lost to the Government

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 506.
Id.
Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 390.
See Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1284; AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN JR. & STEVEN C. BELL,
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:4.6[A] (stating that prior to
IIRIRA, courts often granted voluntary departure periods longer than 120 days and sometimes even for
one to two-year periods for certain classes of aliens.)
172. See In re Villegas Aguirre, 13 I. & N. Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1969) (holding that a timely appeal
"tolls the running of the voluntary departure authorization").
173. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 395 n.ll (Smith, J., dissenting).
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during the pendency of a motion to reopen is nonsensical because the majority fails to make a similar objection to the long standing practice of allowing the alien to remain in the country during his appeal of the
immigration judge's order.
Judge Smith's dissent presents a good argument supporting the contention that Congress did not intend to deprive aliens granted voluntary
departure of the right to file motions to reopen. He points out that the
statute governing the motions grants the right to file to all aliens without
consideration to the nature of departure. 174 The statute provides that "[a]n
alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings,"' 175 and that the motion
must be filed "within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative
order of removal. ' 176 Congress' failure to limit the availability of a motion
to reopen to aliens subject to certain types of final administrative orders is
evidence that it did not intend to preclude aliens granted voluntary departure from pursuing such relief.
The majority's argument is not without merit, though. The fact that
Congress, with the enactment of IIRIRA, chose to severely limit the time
period for which an alien could be granted voluntary departure is evidence
that it wanted to ensure a speedier exit from the country by aliens granted
voluntary departure. This evidence is somewhat weakened, however, by
the Department of Justice's interim rule addressing "the effect of a motion
or appeal to the Immigration Court, BIA, or a federal court on any period
of voluntary departure already granted," which states that a possible option
is to toll the departure period while the motion is pending. 77 The DOJ's
consideration of tolling as a possible answer is an indication that Congress
did not intend to deprive aliens granted voluntary departure of the right to
file a motion to reopen. The interim rule is far from conclusive, however,
as it explicitly states that the DOJ "has not adopted any position" regarding the effect of a motion to reopen on a previously granted period for
voluntary departure. a78 In fact, the interim rule also seems to lend support
to the majority's conclusion as it lists "no tolling of any period of voluntary
departure" as one of the three possible solutions for resolving the
problem.

179

It is important to note, though, that the interim rule speaks not only to
the tolling effect of motions to reopen on the voluntary departure period,
but also to an appeal from an initial grant of voluntary departure.18 0 Thus,
174. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 392 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
176. Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (emphasis added).
177. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of
Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,325-26 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim rule);
see Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that interim rule is the best guidance to determining the tolling effect of motions to reopen); Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288 n.20 (citing the
interim rule for the proposition that "automatic tolling would be consistent with the legislative
scheme").
178. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,326
179. Id.
180. Id. at 10,325-26.
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any support the interim rule could provide to the majority's conclusion is
undermined by the fact that Banda-Ortiz's initial grant of voluntary deparThis
ture was tolled during the time his appeal to the BIA was pending.'
begs the question of why the departure period should be tolled for an appeal-a procedural mechanism seeking review of previously decided issues-but not for a motion to reopen, which seeks consideration of new
evidence not available at the time of the first proceeding. The majority
opinion makes no attempt to answer this important question, and thus, it
uncovers a flaw in the court's rationale.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied heavily on statutory language providing that the voluntary departure period cannot exceed a period of sixty days. 182 The majority stated that tolling the departure period
"would effectively extend the validity of [Bana-Ortiz's] departure period
well beyond the sixty days that Congress has authorized."18' 3 However, the
procedural background in Banda-Ortiz directly contradicts this conclusion.
As previously noted, Banda-Ortiz remained in the country awaiting appeal
for six months after being granted voluntary departure, yet the departure
period was still valid after the BIA issued its decision. Judge Smith recognized this problem and observed in his dissent that by requiring such a
strict reading of the statutory language, the majority's holding "calls into
question a long standing practice" of tolling the voluntary departure period
during the pendency of an appeal to the BIA and also "put[s] in jeopardy
[the alien's] right to any review of the IJ's decision."1'84
The majority's rationale is also open to criticism in that it characterizes
tolling as an extension of time. However, the two terms are not synonymous. The Ninth Circuit correctly noted in Barroso that "tolling does not
extend the amount of time granted for voluntary departure."' 8 5 Rather,
tolling is defined as "stop[ping] the running of" a period of time, while
extension is defined as "[a] period of additional time to take an action. ' 186
Judge Smith agreed with this interpretation and noted that "[i]t is the very
nature of tolling to suspend the period of time provided by statute for cer'
tain, actions, when the circumstances of the case require." 187
He viewed
tolling the departure period as necessary to preserve Banda-Ortiz's statutory right to file a motion to reopen and that doing so "prevent[s] the creation of a legal Scylla and Charybdis that will inevitably lead to the denial of

181. See Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 395 n.ll (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that the sixty day departure period granted by the immigration judge was tolled for six months until the BIA issued its
decision).
182. Id. at 390 (majority opinion); see 8 U.S.C. 1229c(b)(2) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(h) (2006).
183. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390.
184. Id. at 395 (Smith, J., dissenting).
185. Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original); see also
Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 335 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that extending the voluntary departure
period presents a different situation than does tolling).
186. Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1206; BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY 1246, 495 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005).
187. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 395 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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'
meritorious claims." 188
This interpretation presents a better reasoned analysis than does the majority opinion.
Despite its flaws, the majority opinion does raise legitimate concerns
about the potential for abuse that would arise following a holding that motions to reopen do toll the voluntary departure period. Indeed, the majority's holding is far more sound when applied to situations where an alien
has attempted to abuse his statutory right by filing a frivolous motion to
reopen in an attempt to remain in the country beyond the period of time
granted for voluntary departure. In such situations, the benefit to the Government would be lost because it would have to expend time and resources
on hearing a frivolous motion and the subsequent removal of the alien after denial of the motion.'89 Herein lies the main weakness of Judge Smith's
dissent. While the majority opinion fails to consider the injustice that will
be served by depriving aliens granted voluntary departure of the right to
present new evidence, the dissent fails to consider the potentially substantial increase in cost to the Government incurred as a result of aliens abusing motions to reopen to prolong their stay in the country. Judge Smith
argued that Congress addressed this problem by "regulating [the] quantity,
quality, and timeliness" of motions to reopen.1 90 While this assertion may
be true, aliens are still afforded the right to file one motion to reopen, and
Judge Smith fails to offer an adequate solution for curbing potential abuse
of that right. Thus, the dissent, while providing a better analysis than the
majority, fails to provide a fully adequate solution.

C. Implications of the Decision
One effect of the holding in Banda-Ortiz is that it unfairly punishes
aliens who are granted voluntary departure. The majority stated that these
aliens still have a right to file a motion to reopen and have their motion
heard "so long as it does not interfere with the agreed upon voluntary departure date or the Government's interest in the finality of an alien's voluntary departure."' 191 However, the Azarte court correctly noted that such a
result is a near impossibility because "[i]n practice, it takes the BIA more
than a month and often many months or even years to issue a decision.' 1 92
Thus, despite the majority's contrary view, the holding in Banda-Ortiz effectively deprives aliens granted voluntary departure of a statutory right to
188. Id.

189. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(c) and (d)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that an alien cannot be granted voluntary departure a second time after being previously permitted to so depart).
190. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 392 (Smith, J., dissenting).

191. Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
192. Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2005); see Dep't of Justice, Attorney General
Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedure, Aug. 23, 2002, http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_eoir_489.htm (providing that as of February 2002, there were
more than 56,000 cases pending before the BIA, and of those, 10,000 had been pending for three years

or more); Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 393 n.5 (Smith, J. dissenting) (stating that a ruling on the merits of a
motion to reopen before expiration of the voluntary departure period "will be unlikely, given the fact
that, as of September 30, 2004, there were 33,544 cases pending appeal before the BIA, of which 6,059
had been pending from 2003 or earlier").
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have a motion to reopen heard and decided on the merits. Judge Smith
characterized this result as "particularly harsh" because it "operates to disadvantage those aliens whose good behavior has entitled them to the solicitude of the law of voluntary departure."19' 3 Indeed, the result leaves the
alien with no means to offer the BIA new evidence not available in the
original proceeding that could possibly allow the alien to remain in the
country. This hardly seems fair when one considers that aliens whose actions have rendered them ineligible for voluntary departure can exercise
their statutory right to pursue relief in the form of a motion to reopen.
Another possible consequence of Banda-Ortiz is that one of the majority's main objectives will be undermined when the holding is put into
practice. The majority recognized that two of the main purposes of voluntary departure are to reduce the costs to the Government and spare administrative and judicial resources.1 94 The rationale is that if the alien is
granted voluntary departure, he leaves the country on his own cost and the
Government does not have to spend time and money on removing him.
However, the court, in attempting to achieve this result, may have shot
itself in the proverbial foot with its holding. For example, as Judge Smith
noted, the majority's decision has the possibility to cause aliens charged
with removability to "hesitate before requesting voluntary departure because of the now-heightened risk that a successful request will result in the
automatic denial of all forms of discretionary relief."1 9' 5 Thus, if aliens are
not requesting voluntary departure, then the Government must use its
monetary, administrative, and judicial resources to conduct further proceedings and to subsequently remove the alien from the country. In this
scenario, the majority's holding becomes counterintuitive because the end
result actually increases governmental costs rather than having the desired
1 96
effect.
D. Proposed Solution
The problem with the majority and dissenting opinions in Banda-Ortiz
is that they both attempt to establish a bright line rule for their respective
sides of argument that would be applied in every case concerning the interaction between motions to reopen and voluntary departure. This approach, however, invariably injures one of the parties to the proceeding. If
the majority's rule is applied and the voluntary departure period is never
tolled upon the filing of a motion to reopen, then aliens with meritorious
claims would be injured in that they would be precluded from presenting
197
new evidence that may make them eligible for an adjustment of status.
193. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 390 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 396 (Smith, J., dissenting).
196. Benson, supra note 38, at 40, suggests that eliminating or limiting forms of relief (as the
majority does in Banda-Ortiz) increases the alien's incentive to fight harder to remain in the country.
197. See Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 2006) (Smith, J. dissenting) (stating
that failure to toll the voluntary departure period "will inevitably lead to the denial of meritorious
claims"); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Preventing aliens from receiving
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On the other hand, if the dissent's rule is applied and the voluntary departure period is always tolled, then the Government would be injured by having to expend time and resources on hearing frivolous motions to reopen
filed by aliens attempting to abuse this avenue of relief. a9
A solution that would avoid these problems is to determine the tolling
effect of a motion to reopen on a case by case basis. In this scenario, the
immigration judge or BIA would only toll the voluntary departure period
upon a finding that the motion to reopen has merit. This does not mean
that the alien necessarily has to prevail on the motion, just that the motion
is based upon new factual evidence that was not available or could not have
been discovered at the time of the original proceeding. 199 However, if
upon consideration of the motion, the immigration judge or BIA determines that the motion is frivolous, then the voluntary departure period will
not be tolled and the alien will be subject to the penalties set forth in the
statute. This proposed solution would require more work than would a
categorical rule. Nonetheless, it seems to be the best way to ensure a fair
result for both the alien and the Government.
E.

Possibility of Consideration by the Supreme Court

As previously noted, Banda-Ortiz was the first post-IIRIRA case to
hold that a motion to reopen does not toll the voluntary departure period,
thereby creating a circuit split among the Federal Courts of Appeals. As of
March 2007, the circuits were split 4-2 in favor of tolling the voluntary departure period during the pendency of a timely filed motion to reopen.
This split is extremely significant in that aliens subject to voluntary departure that are located in the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are
afforded a statutory right that is denied to those aliens of the same status
located in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Therefore, the issue presented in
Banda-Ortiz seems to be one that the Supreme Court is likely to address
sooner rather than later because of the current disparate treatment of the
same class of aliens that is entirely dependent upon location. Furthermore,
addressing this issue in a timely manner would allow the Court to resolve
an emerging circuit split to ensure that a uniform standard is applied to all
aliens that are granted voluntary departure.
If and when the Supreme Court ultimately elects to decide the issue of
whether the voluntary departure period is tolled upon the timely filing of a
motion to reopen, the likely outcome will depend heavily on the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation. The Court has two competing legal
decisions on their motions to reopen would eliminate all possibility of redress if their circumstances
changed. If Congress had desired such a draconian result, we are confident it would have said so."); cf
Benson, supra note 38, at 39 (stating that by focusing "on the number of removals or on the speed of
adjudication," Congress, agencies, and courts fail "to fully acknowledge the human lives involved").
198. See Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 2006) (providing that if motions to
reopen tolled the voluntary departure period, then aliens "would have a strong incentive to file a [frivolous] motion to reopen in order to delay their departure").
199. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2006).
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theories to choose from-formalism and realism.2 °° If the Court takes a
formalistic approach to interpreting the statutory language, then it will almost certainly side with the majority opinion in Banda-Ortiz and the Fifth
Circuit. This is because formalism would require a strict application of
§ 1229c(b)(2)'s sixty day limitation on voluntary departure considering
neither the surrounding factual context of the particular case nor the lives
that will be affected by a strict application of the law. On the other hand, if
the Court employs the broader realistic approach, then it would likely
reach the same result as Judge Smith and the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits. This is because when considering the interaction of voluntary departure and motions to reopen in light of social interests and public policy, the Court would most likely raise the same concerns addressed
by Judge Smith in his dissent.
The best guidance to determining which approach the Supreme Court
is likely to choose is to look to the Court's previous holdings. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,21 the Court held "where two statutes are 'capable
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." 2 2 This
holding appears to preclude the Court from proceeding under a formalistic
approach because so doing would make the voluntary departure statute
and the motion to reopen statute unable to co-exist as currently written, at
least with respect to aliens granted voluntary departure. This conclusion is
further supported by the fact that it has long been the position of the Court
that "[r]epeals by implication are not favored."2 3 Thus, it appears likely, if
and when the Supreme Court considers the issue presented in Banda-Ortiz,
that it will take a broader, more realistic approach than did the Fifth Circuit in order to preserve the full power of the current statutory scheme.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In attempting to guard against potential abuse of motions to reopen by
aliens subject to voluntary departure, the Fifth Circuit's holding in BandaOrtiz put aliens with meritorious claims in a Catch-22 leaving them without
any avenue to exercise their statutory right to have their motions decided
on the merits. The court left its decision open to criticism by failing to
explain why motions to reopen should be treated differently than an appeal
200. Formalism is "[tihe theory that law is a set of rules and principles independent of other
political and social institutions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see Gerald B. Wetlaufer,
Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12
(stating formalism is the theory "that the law generally is, and should be, unresponsive to particular
factual contexts and circumstances," and laws are "indifferent to what we have come to see as either the
needs of society or the purposes that law might serve."). Realism on the other hand, is "[tihe theory
that law is based, not on formal rules or principles, but instead on judicial decisions that should derive
from social interests and public policy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see Wetlaufer, supra
this note, at 20 (stating that realism is the theory "that the law is an institution that should evolve in
ways that are responsive to the changing (factual) needs of the society it serves").
201. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
202. Id. at 1018 (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-134 (1974)).
203. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 105 (1868).
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filed subsequent to a grant of voluntary departure. The dissenting opinion,
while better reasoned and reaching a sounder result, still left something to
be desired because of its failure to provide any governmental safeguard
against frivolous motions to reopen. The conclusion to be drawn from
Banda-Ortiz is that a bright line rule cannot be used to satisfy both the
alien's and the Government's competing interests. Such a task is better left
to a case-by-case analysis.

